

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 15, 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: T. Hunt, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending October 15, 2004

Safety Class Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs). Based on recent incidents concerning the procurement and control of material (e.g., cell door gap sealant), BWXT has suspended all non-essential repairs or modifications to safety class SSCs pending review of existing material inventories and determination of the extent of any weaknesses in its material control processes. Additional immediate actions include an examination of each safety class SSC with a focus on any repairs or modifications and a determination of procedural improvements and controls needed to ensure future procurement and receipt inspection activities support installation and maintenance of safety class SSCs. PXSO plans to request that BWXT include commercially procured special tooling used for hoisting and rigging as part of the assessment.

Hazard Analysis Reports (HAR) Development. PXSO issued a memorandum Thursday that questions the current attempt by NA-121 to revise DOE-STD-3016, *Hazard Analysis Reports for Nuclear Explosives Operations*. Since DOE-STD-3016 alone does not provide sufficient guidance to develop defensible HARs, Pantex nuclear explosive operations use HARs developed from requirements for safety analysis reports discussed in DOE-STD-3009, *Preparation Guide for U.S. DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports*. Drafts of the revised DOE-STD-3016 add new requirements for HARs, facilities, and equipment that PXSO believes would require significant resources to implement. An example is a proposal to require that nuclear explosive facilities meet natural phenomenon hazard performance requirements of PC-4. PXSO believes that since NA-121 is responsible for the nuclear explosive safety study requirements, it is inappropriate for it to dictate the process used to create safety bases for nuclear explosive operations. Pantex has historically tried to keep these two processes independent of each other.

SS-21 Implementation. BWXT is requesting that NNSA grant nuclear explosive safety study (NESS) extensions for the B83 and W87 SS-21 implementation projects due to classified media related delays. The current NESS expiration date for both programs is March 31, 2005, which is prior to the expected SS-21 implementation dates of April 30, 2005 for the B83 and May 31, 2005 for the W87 weapon programs. The full impact of the delays on the B61 SS-21 implementation and NESS expiration cannot be determined until Los Alamos National Laboratory has been fully authorized to process classified material.

Contractor Assurance System (CAS) Plan. BWXT recently issued its fiscal year 2005 (FY05) CAS plan which includes a listing of assessments and enhancements planned for the coming year. Elements expected to be implemented in FY05 to improve the Pantex CAS program are training of personnel on the contractor readiness assessment process, enhancing the effectiveness and documentation of the critiques process, and developing a comprehensive lessons learned training program.